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We investigate learning in a setting where each period a population has to choose
between two actions and the payo of each action is unknown by the players. The popu-
lation learns according to reinforcement and the environment is non-stationary, meaning
that there is correlation between the payo of each action today and the payo of each
action in the past. We show that when players observe realized and foregone payos, a
suboptimal mixed strategy is selected. On the other hand, when players only observe
realized payos, a unique action, which is optimal if actions perform dierent enough, is
selected in the long run. When looking for ecient reinforcement learning rules, we nd
that it is optimal to disregard the information from foregone payos and to learn as if
only realized payos were observed.
JEL Classication Number: C73.
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Part of this work was written during my visit to the University of Wisconsin-Madison. I'm grateful to
the faculty at UW and the participants in the Theory Lunch. I would like to thank Karl Schlag and Larry
Samuelson for useful discussions and comments. I would also like to thank Mark Le Quement for useful
comments and the seminar audiences at the University of Alicante and at the European University Institute.
yjavier.rivas@eui.eu. Department of Economics, European University Institute. Via della Piazzuola 43,
50133 Florence (Italy). www.eui.eu/Personal/Researchers/JavierRivas.
11 Introduction
Imagine the simple decision problem in which every period individuals in a population have
to choose between two alternatives. The payo of these two alternatives is not know by the
players. What is more, the payo of the alternatives could vary over time according to some
distribution also unknown for the players.
This decision problem is faced by many of us in our everyday lives: whether to buy a PC
or a Mac, whether to have fruit or a cake as a dessert in a restaurant, or whether to watch an
action movie or a romantic movie at the theater. Although oblivious of the payo we will get
from making these choices, we might have some information that can help in choosing the
better alternative. This information could have been obtained, for instance, from our own
experiences in the past or via word-of-mouth communication.
In this paper we study how the choices made by a population evolve in the setting just
described. The model we present has two major features about how players learn and about
how the payos change. First, players learn according to reinforcement, whereby actions that
where successful in the past are more likely to be chosen. Second, the underlying distribution
determining the payo of each action is non-stationary. This means that the payo today of
a given action depends on the payo it yielded in the past. In particular, we consider the
case in which payos depend deterministically on the state of nature. The state of nature
changes following a Markov chain. Hence, the probability of being at a given state tomorrow
depends on which state we are in today. Players are ignorant of this fact; they simply observe
that the payo of available actions changes over time.
In the learning literature, as well as in the economic literature in general, randomness
determining the outcome of certain events or actions is almost always assumed to follow a
stationary i.i.d. process. This assumption is clearly made for the sake of technical simplicity,
as real life phenomena, such as nancial markets, gambling, population biology, statistical
mechanics, etc., quite often follow non-stationary processes. To our knowledge, only Ben-
Porath et al. (1993) and Rustichini (1999) deal with the evolutionary properties of models
where nature follows a non-stationary process.
Ben-Porath et al. (1993) present an evolutionary model that is framed within a changing
environment. They study two types of environments: one in which the change is deterministic
and another in which the changes in environment follow a Markov chain. In their model,
players' actions are subject to random mutations. They characterize the mutation rate that
maximizes population growth in the long run.
Rustichini (1999) presents a paper that focuses on the optimality of two dierent pop-
ulation dynamics within a Markovian environment. In his model, the environment changes
2according to a Markov chain, and for any state in the chain there is a unique action that
maximizes payo. Rustichini (1999) studies the optimality properties of linear and exponen-
tial (logit) adjustment process when players have innite memory. An adjustment process or
learning rule is simply a map between information and strategies. Rustichini (1999) considers
two dierent informational settings about payos of actions. In one of these settings players
observe the performance of all the actions (realized and foregone payos are observed), while
in the other they only observe the performance of the action chosen (only realized payos are
observed).
As in Rustichini (1999), we consider two informational settings: one in which both realized
and foregone payos are observed and another in which only realized payos are observed.
There are two main dierences between Rustichini's work and ours. First, we consider a very
general set of learning rules instead of only two specic rules. Second, and most importantly,
in our setting players don't use the whole history of past payo realizations. Instead, as pre-
scribed by reinforcement, players learn using the information they have from their most recent
payo experiences. The reason why we are interested in a setting where players have limited
memory is that empirical and theoretical literature in psychology and economics agrees that
limited memory is a better assumption for modeling human behavior than innite memory
(see for example, Rubinstein (1998), Hirshleifer and Welch (2002) and Conlisk (1996)).
As already mentioned, the learning rules considered in this paper have the property of
being reinforcing. According to reinforcement learning, actions that were more successful
today are more likely to be adapted for tomorrow. Reinforcement has been found to be
one of the main driving forces of human behavior in repeated decision problems. For some
detailed expositions on reinforcement learning and its relationship with real life behavior the
reader is referred to Roth and Erev (1995), Erev and Roth (1998) and Camerer and Ho
(1999).
When both realized and foregone payos are observed, reinforcement is translated into
being more likely to play tomorrow the action that was better today. For this setting, we use
a generalization of the best response behavior that we call the Stochastic Better Response.
Under the Stochastic Better Response, the probability of playing tomorrow a given action
increases if and only if today that action was better than the other one. The magnitude of
the change in probabilities of playing either action depends on the specic functional form
used. The Stochastic Better Response is a very general learning rule that allows players
to respond to the magnitude and not just the ordering of payos of each action. Note
that the Stochastic Better Response is a dierent concept from the Stochastic Better Reply
Dynamics (Josephson (2007)). The Stochastic Better Reply Dynamics are the dynamics for
the evolution of strategies resulting when players use the better response, which is a particular
3case of the Stochastic Better Response.
When foregone payos are not observed, players can not directly compare the perfor-
mance of both actions within the same time period. In this case, players reinforce (possibly
negatively) the action they played. How much they reinforce this action will depend on the
payo achieved. We use a general case of the Cross (1973) learning rule that also generalizes
the rules in B orgers et. al. (2004) (BMS, henceforth). We call this rule the General Rein-
forcement Rule. Note that players could use the General Reinforcement Rule even if they
observe foregone payos. While this implies that players are disregarding information, we
will show that it may be optimal to do so.
Under the Cross Learning Rule, players increase the probability of playing the action just
played by the payo yielded by that action. An interesting result shown by B orgers and Sarin
(1997) is that a population that plays according the Cross Learning Rule exhibits a behavior
that converges to replicator dynamics.
The rules in BMS can incorporate aspiration levels (exogenous or endogenous): in other
words, if the payo of the action chosen is higher than the aspiration level, then the probability
of playing that action increases for the next period. On the other hand, if the payo achieved
by the action chosen is smaller than the aspiration level, then the probability of playing that
action decreases for next period. The rules in BMS are linear on payos. We relax this by
allowing for any increasing function on realized payo.
In the case where foregone payos are observed, we show that the continuous time limit of
the evolution of strategies converges to a situation where every period every action is played
with a constant probability bounded away from 1. The specic value of the probability by
which each action is played at every period will depend on two things: rst, the dierence
in payos between the two actions and the specic form of Stochastic Better Response used,
and, second, on the probabilities that the limiting distribution of the Markov chain for states
puts on each state. The behavior found in this setting is a generalization to what is know
as probability matching. Under probability matching, if an action is best a fraction x of
the time, then in any given period it is played with probability x. The best reply matching
behavior is clearly suboptimal. While some experimental papers report that this behavior is
observed in real life (see, for example, Rubinstein (2002), Siegel and Goldstein (1959)), there
does not seem to be consensus as to whether probability matching is in fact present in the
behavior of real life agents (see, for instance, Vulkan (2000) and Shanks et. al. (2002)).
The results found in this informational setting are also closely related to the ndings by
Kosfeld et. al. (2002). They study a setting where a nite set of players repeatedly play a
normal-form game. Players adapt their strategies by increasing the probability of playing a
4certain action only if this action is a best reply to the actions played by the other agents.
Hence, the rule they use is a particular case of the Stochastic Better Response in which the
magnitude of payos is irrelevant for the updating of strategies. Our setting is also dierent
from theirs in that players do not play against other players but against nature and in that
we consider a general class of rules instead of only one. Kosfeld et. al. (2002) nd that the
continuous time limit of the system converges to a best-reply matching equilibrium. In a
best-reply matching equilibrium each player plays an action with a probability that is equal
to the probability that this action is a best response to the actions of the other players. The
probability matching behavior found in this paper for games against nature is the equivalent
to the best-reply matching equilibrium found in Kosfeld et. al. (2002). In Section 5.1 this
issue is discussed in more depth.
In our second informational setting, when foregone payos are not observed, we show that
the population may end up playing a suboptimal action. The population surely selects the
action that has higher average payo only if the dierence between the average payo of the
two actions is high enough. Hence, the system may lock-on to a suboptimal action. In this
respect, our work extends Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) results to a general set of learning
rules and an environment that may not be stationary.
Our results are rounded o by characterizing the ecient rules for both informational
settings. A striking result is that when foregone payos are observed, it is optimal to ignore
the extra information conveyed by the payo of the action not chosen. That is, players are
better o by learning using the General Reinforcement Rule, which only uses the information
of the realized payo. This is due to the fact that observing foregone payos leads players to
adopt the action that is best today but may be not the best in the long run. That is, players
are "distracted" by observing the performance of all the actions. When foregone payos are
not observed, we show that if players use learning rules that diminish the magnitude of payos,
that is, that have very cautious and show slow learning, then the population learns the optimal
action. These results from are in contrast to those of Rustichini's (1999). In Rustichini (1999),
when the population uses the exponential rule (fast learning) the best action is selected only
in situations where foregone payos are observed, whereas if populations uses the linear
rule (slow learning) best action is selected only in situations where foregone payos are not
observed. Here, instead, we nd that under reinforcement learning it is optimal to disregard
foregone payos and to exhibit slow learning in both informational settings.
This paper's contribution to the literature is twofold. Our rst contribution to the lit-
erature is the introduction new techniques for dealing with correlated states of nature. As
mentioned, very few papers have studied the situation in which the future realization of the
state of nature depends on its past realizations. Most papers on learning consider either that
5the environment does not change or that it changes independently of past realizations. This
is due to the technical diculties involved in dealing with correlated realizations of states. In
this paper we show how these diculties can, at least partially, be overcome. The proofs for
the result for the Stochastic Better Response demonstrate how dependent randomness can
be dealt with by showing that for any possible realization of states of nature, the position
of the system in the future can be approximated by the dierences in speed of convergence
towards each action.
The proof of the result for the case where foregone payos are not observed extends Ellison
and Fudenberg's (1995) result to the case where the distribution of payos is not stationary.
We show that the behavior of a system that evolves according to a Markov Chain can be
approximated by the behavior of a system in which the probability of each state occurring is
independent and equal to the limiting distribution of the Markov Chain.
Our second contribution is the extension of the knowledge about stimulus response learn-
ing models and evolutionary models. The dierences in the behavior of the population under
the two informational settings are very intriguing and of interesting application for real life
situations. For instance, why can inferior technologies come to dominate the market? A
well known example is that when the video format VHS took over from the superior format
Betamax. The model can explain that if the two technologies are not too dierent in terms
of performance, the stochastic evolution of nature can lead the population to lock on the
suboptimal choice forever. In the example with video formats, during the rst months after
the release of both technologies, Betamax tapes could not hold an entire movie. This caused
the population to slowly adopt the VHS format. Once the true potential of Betamax was
revealed, it was too late, consumers had already locked on the inferior technology.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. The two
informational settings are introduced in Section 3. Results are developed in Section 4. Section
5 presents a discussion and a deeper comparison of this work with the existing literature.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a continuum of identical players of measure 1. Every period t = 0;1;::: players
in the population have to choose between action 1 or action 2. The payo of each player at
time t depends on her action and on the current state of nature st 2 f1;:::;mg. If a player
chooses action i and the state equals j then she gets a payo ij 2 [0;1] with i 2 f1;2g
and j 2 f1;:::;mg. Note that the payo of each player does not depend on the actions
played by others but only on her own action and the state of nature. We assume there is
6no weakly dominant action. That is, there exists no i 2 f1;2g such that ij   ij for all
j 2 f1;:::;mg. Without loss of generality we assume that for some h < m, 1j  2j for
j  h and 2j > 1j for j > h. That is, in the rst h states action 1 yields at least the same
payo as action 2. In the remaining states, action 2 yields more payo than action 1. Finally,
we dene j as the vector of payos of action 1 and action 2 in state j, j = (1j;2j).
The sequence of states of nature fstg1
t=0 follows a discrete Markov process P with m  2
states. The probability of transiting from state i to state j is given by ij 2 [0;1]. We assume
the Markov chain to be irreducible and aperiodic. Hence, if ij = 0 for some i;j 2 f1;:::;mg
then there exists a sequences of states k1;k2;:::;kn 2 f1;:::;mg with n  m such that
ik1;k1;k2;:::;kn;j 6= 0. We dene  2 [0;1]m as the limiting distribution of the Markov
chain P where i is the weight the limit distribution puts in state i. An environment is
dened then by the payo vectors together with a transition matrix, f(1;:::;m);Pg.
A strategy is the probability of playing each action at a given period. We denote by
t
i 2 [0;1] with i 2 f1;2g and t 2 f0;1;:::g the probability of playing action i at time
t. Dene  = (
1;
2) 2 [0;1]2 as the strategy that maximizes payo in the long run.








j ( 11j +  22j):
Since we are dealing with a continuum of population, Law of Large Numbers applies and
we have that t
i is also the fraction of players playing action i at time t. In an abuse of
notation, throughout the paper we will refer to t
i as both the probability for a single player
of playing action i at time t and the fraction of the population playing action i at time t.
Note that given our setting, the sequence i = ft
ig1
t=0 is an irreducible and aperiodic
Markov process on [0;1] for i 2 f1;2g. The aim of the paper is to characterize, if it exists,
the invariant distribution of such process.
The timing within each time period works as follows. First, players choose actions ac-
cording to their strategies. Then, nature decides the state. Third, payos are realized and
players observe their payo and possibly forgone payos. The possibility of observing fore-
gone payos depends on the informational setting being considered. Finally, players update
their strategies.
When updating their strategies, players use the following information: their strategy at
the beginning of the period, the action they played and the payo they got and possibly the
payo the other action would have yielded (foregone payos). Formally, a learning rule is a
function b : [0;1]2 f1;2g2 [0;1]2 ! [0;1]2. That is, a function that maps three arguments,
strategies for the present period, action played and payo gotten and action not played and
7foregone payo, into the strategies for the following period. The functional form of b will
depend on the specic learning rule under consideration.
3 Informational Settings
3.1 Forgone Payoffs are Observed
When both realized and foregone payos are observed, players best respond to the environ-
ment by increasing the probability of playing at the next period the action that was most
successful at the present period. We use a generalization of the best response behavior that
we call the Stochastic Better Response.
We write t+1
i jj to denote the value of t+1
i given that at period t the state of nature, st,










where  > 0 is a learning speed parameter. The function f : [0;1]2 ! [0;1] maps the payo
of the action that yielded higher payo and the payo of the other action into a number
between 0 and 1. This function is interpreted as the probability of adopting or learning the
action that was best given today's state of nature. The only requirement on f is that it
must be weakly increasing in the payo of the action that yielded higher payo and weakly
decreasing in the payo of the other action. That is, f is weakly increasing (decreasing) in ij
only if ij > (<) ij. We set f(j) = 0 if and only if 1j = 2j. In other words, we assume
that the population does not change strategies if and only if both actions yielded the same
payo. The function f could also be a constant. In the case where the function f is constant
and equals 1, the learning rule is equivalent to the standard best response in which players
show inertia with probability 1    (as in Samuelson (1994) and Kosfeld et. al. (2002)).
The intuition behind the Stochastic Better Response is the following. In each period, all
players observe the payo of the action chosen and the payo of the other action. Then every
player updates her strategy in the following way. The probability of playing action i in the
next period is increased if and only if action i yielded higher payo than the other action
in the current period. The increase in the probability of playing action i will depend on the
dierence in payos between the two actions.
A dierent interpretation of this same rule uses the fact that i can be considered as the
fraction of population playing action i deterministically. Under this interpretation, at every
period, players that did not play the best action will change their actions (best response to
8the environment) with some probability. The probability of changing action depends on the
dierence in payo between the two actions. The Stochastic Better Response is an individual
learning rule because actions played by other players have no eect on the updating of the
one's own strategy.
As an example, we can look at two possible ways of writing the Stochastic Better Response.





















A second example could be the following, where only the payo of the best action at the










3.2 Foregone Payoffs are not Observed
When foregone payos are not observed, players have no means of directly comparing the
performance of both actions within the same time period. In this case, players reinforce
(possibly negatively) the action they played. How much they reinforce this action will depend
on the payo achieved. We use a general case of the Cross (1973) learning rule that also
generalizes the rules in BMS. We call this rule the General Reinforcement Rule.
Let t+1
i jkj be the probability by which a player plays action i at time t + 1 given that
action k was played at time t and state at time t, st, was j. The General Reinforcement Rule
is dened by
t+1




1 j2j = t
1   t
1g(2j);
and similarly for t+1
2 j1j and t+1
2 j2j. The only assumption we make in g : [0;1] !
[ 1;1] is that it must be weakly increasing in its argument. If g(ij) = ij then we have
the Cross Learning Rule. For the rules in BMS we have that g(ij) = Aij + Bijij for
given Aij 2 R and Bij 2 R for i 2 f1;2g and j 2 f1;:::;mg. BMS show that setting




1g and Bij = 1=maxf1   0
1;0
1g for all i;j results
in the best monotone rule. A rule is dened to be monotone if the expected probability of
playing the action that is best given today's state increases. A rule is said to be the best
monotone rule if the expected increase in playing the best action from one period to another
is highest among all monotone rules. Since BMS study a setting in which the evolution of
9nature follows a stationary distribution, the action that is best today is the action that is
best at every period. In our setting the action that is best today may not be the best action
tomorrow due to the Markovian evolution of the states of nature. This particular dierence
will have important consequences in the optimality properties of the rules in BMS.
4 Results
4.1 Results - Foregone payoffs are Observed
Before going to the formal results, we present a small discussion on the behavior of the system
under the Stochastic Better Response. First, note that the biggest dierence in the behavior
of the two rules that we consider lies in the way they behave when i is close to the corners
(0 and 1). In particular, under the Stochastic Better Response the corners are not absorbing
while the opposite occurs under the General Reinforcement Rule.
Assume for this short discussion that there are only two states of nature. Under the
Stochastic Better Response, the speed at which a player adopts an action slows down as the
probability of playing that action increases. That is, consider that action 1 is played with
a high probability and that today action 1 yielded a higher payo than action 2. Then the
increase in the probability of playing action 1 will be small. On the other hand, consider
that action 1 is played with a small probability and today action 1 yielded higher payo than
action 2. In this case the probability of playing action 1 next period increases sharply.
Figure 1 shows the movements of the probability of playing action i (i) as a response to
an action being better than the other in the current period. As above, assume that an action
is played with a high probability. Then the increase in playing that action in case it yielded
a higher payo than the other action at the present period is low.
Figure 1: Stochastic Better Response
As one could possibly guess already, the Stochastic Better Response will not converge
to any of the corners. To study convergency, we consider the limit case when , which
can be viewed as the size of the changes in i, gets arbitrarily small. Once such a limit is
10taken, the Stochastic Better Response converges to a single point. This issue can be seen
much more clear by looking at Figure 2, where a simulation is conducted. The specic
learning rule used is given by equation 1. The value of the parameters is set to m = 2,
11 = 0:5;12 = 0:3;21 = 0:1;22 = 0:6 and 12 = 21 = 0:3. The initial value 1 was set to
0
1 = 0:5. The gure depicts the same simulation, the same random seed, for two situations:
one in which  = 1 and another in which  = 0:05.
Figure 2: Simulation - Stochastic Better Response
By studying the behavior of the system when  is made arbitrarily small we are char-
acterizing the continuous time limit of i. When  is taken to zero the adjustment in the
strategies is made arbitrarily small while keeping constant the speed at which the environ-
ment changes. For other papers that use this continuous time limit approximation in settings
somewhat dierent from ours see, for example, B orgers and Sarin (1997) and Bena m and
Weibull (2003).
The following proposition characterizes the convergence of (1;2) under the Stochastic
Better Response when  is arbitrarily small. Later in this section we present a sketch of the




















11The interpretation of the result is the following. For simplicity of the exposition let us
focus on the evolution of the variable 1 and assume again that there are only two states
of nature. The point ~  corresponds to the situation where an increase in t
1 due to action
1 yielding higher payo at time t than action 2 would be equivalent to the decrease in t
1








1 j2   t
1
 . In Figure 1, the point ~  would be such that the size of
the arrows (or jumps) towards the left from a given point t
1 is the same as the size of the
arrows towards the right from this same point t
1. Hence, ~  is the point where the marginal
movements towards action 1 and towards action 2 are equalized.
One can easily check that ~  < 1, so it will never be the case that the best action in the
long run is played with probability 1. For the general case where the Markov chain has m





inequality holds in the simulation in Figure 2. However, for that simulation we have that
~  = 0:57. That is, in the long run at any given period action 1 is played with probability of




j=1 j2j then the t
1 that
maximizes payo in the long run is  = 1.
Let us now look at a sketch of the proof. To studying the convergence of the sequence
1 we rst show that it suces to study the convergence of a sequence y = fytg1
t=^ t, for ^ t
large enough, which evolves in a world with just 2 states of nature and symmetric transition
matrix.
First, dene the sequence ^ 1 = f^ t
1g1








> > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > :
^ t
1 + ^ t
2f(1) with probability 1
. . .
^ t
1 + ^ t
2f(h) with probability h
^ t
1   ^ t
1f(h+1) with probability h+1
. . .
^ t
1   ^ t
1f(m) with probability m
:








Hence, the expected value of both 1 and ^ 1 converge in probability to the same value. This
is because the transition matrix P is irreducible and aperiodic. Now dene the sequence
y = fytg1
t=^ t as y
^ t = ^ 
^ t
1 and dene recursively
yt+1 =
(
yt + 2(1   yt)
P
j:1j2j jf(j) with probability 1=2
yt   2yt
P
j:1j<2j jf(j) with probability 1=2
:
12Note that the variable y evolves according to the expected movement in the long run of
the variable ^ 1. It can be easily seen that yt = ^ t
1 implies E0(yt+1) = E0(^ t+1
1 ). Hence, since
y
^ t = ^ 
^ t
1, the distribution of both yt and ^ t
1 is aperiodic and both E0(y
^ t+1) and E0(^ 
^ t+1
1 ) are
linear in their arguments, we can state that E0(y
^ t+k) = E0(^ 
^ t+k
1 ) for any k 2 N. Moreover,
we have that for any t > ^ t, equation 2 must hold. Hence, we have that for any " > 0 and




1)   E0(yt)j > "

= 0:
Furthermore, by making  arbitrarily small we make the variance of both random variables
yt and t
1 to shrink to zero. Thus, their limiting distribution puts weight on a single point.
In other words, y and 1 must converge in probability to a xed value  y and   respectively.
Since E0(y
^ t+k) converges to E0(
^ t+k
1 ) for all k 2 N, we must have that  y =  . Hence, instead
of studying the convergence of the variable 1 we focus on the convergence of the variable y.
This is more formally stated in Lemma 2 in the Appendix.
Note now that the point yt = ~ , with ~  as dened in Proposition 1, solves the equation
yt + 2(1   yt)
X
j:1j2j




Dene the sequence y1 = fyt
1g1




yt if yt  ~ 
~  otherwise
:
Hence, we have that E0(yt)  E0(yt
1) for all t > ^ t. Note that E0(yt+1
1 )  E0(yt
1). Therefore,
y1 is a super-martingale with lower bound ~ . Thus, by the martingale convergence theorem,
y1 converges in probability to ~ . This implies that for t large enough, E0(yt)  ~ .
Dene now the sequence y2 = fyt
2g1




yt if yt  ~ 
~  otherwise
:
Therefore, we have that E0(yt)  E0(yt
2) for all t > ^ t. Note that E0(yt+1
1 )  E0(yt
2). Hence,
y2 is a sub-martingale with upper bound ~ . Thus, by the martingale convergence theorem,
y2 converges in probability to ~ . This implies that for t large enough, E0(yt)  ~ .
Hence, we know that for t large enough, E0(yt)  ~  and E0(yt)  ~ . This implies that for
all t > ^ t, E0(yt) = ~ . Since the variance of y shrinks to zero as  is made arbitrarily small,
we have that y converges in probability to ~  as  is made arbitrarily small. Combined with
the fact that y converges in probability to 1, this implies that 1 converges in probability
to ~ .
134.2 Results - Foregone Payoffs are not Observed
We recall that the probability by which a player plays action i at time t+1 given that action
k was played at time t and state at time t was j is denoted by t+1
i jkj and given by
t+1








1 jj, which is the probability of playing action 1 at time t + 1 given that state
was j, equals t
1 +t
2g(1j) if action 1 was played at time t and t
1  t
1g(2j) if action 2 was
played at time t. Action i with i 2 f1;2g is played at time t with probability t
i. Hence, since
we are dealing with a continuum of players, we can use Law of Large Numbers to state that
t+1
1 jj = t
1t+1
1 j1j + t
2t+1
1 j2j:
This can be rewritten as
t+1




1 + (1   t
1)g(1j)









Thus, it follows that
t+1
i jj = t
i
 




Note that if we set g(ij) = ij, as in the Cross Learning Rule, the resulting law of motion
for i is the discreet time version of the Replicator Dynamics. That is, if g(ij) = ij then
we have that
t+1









The General Reinforcement Rule behaves completely dierently to the Stochastic Better
Response. Under the General Reinforcement Rule, the changes in the variable t
i become
smaller as t
i gets closer to either bound. For example, consider that action 1 is played with
a high probability. Then the change in i will be small independently of whether action 1
yielded higher payo than action 2 or the other way around. Figure 3 shows the movements
of 1 under the General Reinforcement Rule as a response to the environment.
As we see, the process will spend almost no time in intermediate values of i. This will
allow us to draw our conclusions from analyzing only the behavior of i in the neighborhoods
of its bounds. In this respect, our analysis will partially rely on the approach by Ellison and
Fudenberg (1995).
14Figure 3: General Reinforcement Rule
Figure 4: Simulation - General Reinforcement Rule
Figure 4 shows a simulation for the General Reinforcement Rule for the case where
g(ij) = ij and with the same parameters as the ones used in Figure 2. The gure plots the
result of the same simulation performed with two dierent random seeds.
It can be seen that the General Reinforcement Rule quickly converges to a situation in
which all the population plays the same action a fraction 1 of the time. An interesting
thing to note is that the action selected by the General Reinforcement Rule does not coincide
necessarily with the action that is best in the long run. The simulation on the right-hand side
shows a situation in which the General Reinforcement Rule converges to a situation where
all players in the population are playing the suboptimal action. As we will see, this is the
result of the two actions performing not too dierently in terms of payos in the long run.
The following proposition, whose proof is presented in the Appendix, characterizes the
convergence of the sequence 1.




j logj > 0; (4)
m X
j=1
j log ^ j > 0: (5)
1. If both (4) and (5) hold then limt!1 t
1 does not exist.
2. If (4) holds but (5) does not then limt!1 t
1 = 1.
3. If (5) holds but (4) does not then limt!1 t
1 = 0.
4. If neither (4) nor (5) hold then limt!1 t
1 has full support over f0;1g.
Since 2 = 1   1 the convergence of the sequence 2 follows for the proposition above.
An important fact revealed by proposition above is that the process may fail to converge to
the best action. Consider for simplicity the Cross Learning Rule, where g(ij) = ij. Action





condition can be rewritten as
Pm
j=1 jj  1. However, even if
Pm
j=1 jj  1 holds, it may
still happen that
Pm
j=1 j logj < 0 holds and hence 1 may not converge to 1. To make this
point more clear consider the case in which m = 2 and 1 = 2 = 0:5. That is, there are
only two states of nature and both states are equally likely in the long run. The following
corollary characterizes the convergence of 1 in this case when action 1 is better in the long
run than action 2.
Corollary 1. Assume g(ij) = ij, m = 2, 1 = 2 = 0:5 and 11 + 12 > 21 + 22.
- If 11 + 12   21   22   (11   21)(22   12) > 0 then limt!1 1 = 1.
- Otherwise, limt!1 1 has full support over f0;1g.
Proof. We can rewrite inequalities (4) and (5) from Proposition 2 for the case with m = 2
and 1 = 2 = 0:5 as follows:
log1 + log2 > 0 (6)
log ^ 1 + log ^ 2 > 0: (7)
The conditions (6) and (7) can be rewritten as 12 > 1 and ^ 1^ 2 > 1. These in turn can
be rewritten as
11 + 12   21   22   (11   21)(22   12) > 0; (8)
21 + 22   11   12   (11   21)(22   12) > 0: (9)
16It can be easily seen that equation (9) is never holding. Hence, by Proposition 2, if the
inequality (8) holds then we have that limt!1 1 = 1, whereas if (8) does not hold we have
that limt!1 1 has full support over f1;2g.
For the process to select the best action, the two actions need to perform signicantly
dierently. That is, having action 1 better than action 2, 11 + 12   21   22 > 0, is not
enough for the process to select the best action.
Now we present the intuition for the proof of Proposition 2 for the case where g(ij) = ij.
The proof of Proposition 2 relies partially on the analysis by Ellison and Fudenberg (1995).
In Ellison and Fudenberg (1995), the realization of states of nature is independent of past
values of states. In order to be able to apply Ellison and Fudenberg's analysis to our setting,
we proceed as follows. Given that the transition matrix P is irreducible and aperiodic, the
state of nature many periods ahead is independent of the state of nature today. This means
that by the law of large numbers, we can take the probability of each state being realized
many periods ahead as the limiting probability placed on it by the Markov chain. Therefore,
for the rest of the exposition we consider that the realization of states is independent of past
values. For a formal proof the reader is referred to Lemma 4 in the Appendix.
Assume, for the simplicity of the exposition, that there are only two states of nature. Let
1   p be the probability by which state 1 occurs. Since the process spends almost no time
at its intermediate values, it suces to examine the convergence of the variable i when it
is close to its boundary values (0 and 1). To make the exposition clearer, we focus on the
sequence 2 = 1   1. Imagine that 2 is arbitrarily close to 0. Then we can rewrite (3) as
follows:
t+1
2 jj = jt
2 + o(t
2) (10)
where j = 1+g(2j) g(1j) for j 2 f1;2g and o(t
2) is a term of order higher than 2 and
hence is negligible when 2 is arbitrarily small. Without loss of generality we can assume











Since 11 > 21 and 12 < 22 we have that 2 > 1 > 1 > 0. Finally, note that 1j  2j
with probability 1   p and 1j < 2j with probability p.
The sequence 2 converges to 0, or 1 converges to 1, if and only if the sequence x =
fxtg1
t=0 with xt = logt
2 converges to  1. The process for x when t




log1 + xt with probability 1   p
log2 + xt with probability p
:
Therefore, Et(xt+1) = (1   p)log1 + plog2 + xt. Hence, if (1   p)log1 + plog2 > 0
then Et(xt+1) > xt, which implies that x is a sub-martingale. Thus, by the Martingale
Convergence Theorem, if (1   p)log1 + plog2 > 0 then x cannot converge to  1 and
hence 2 cannot converge to 0. Which implies that 1 does not converge to 1.
Ellison and Fudenberg's (1995) result is presented here for the readers' convenience.
Lemma 1 (Ellison and Fudenberg (1995)). Let zt be a Markov Process on (0,1) with
zt+1 =
(
1zt + o(zt) with probability 1   p
2zt + o(zt) with probability p
:
















then there are  > 0 and " > 0 such that if z0 <  then P
 










there is a  z > 0 such that for all z0 > 0 and all t 2 f0;1;:::g, P
 
zt <  z

= 0.
4.3 Efficient Learning Rules
We say that a learning rule is ecient if it is able to select to optimal action in the long run.
An interesting result is that if foregone payos are observed, then it is optimal to disregard
this information and to act as if only realized payos were observed.
When players observe the performance of both actions they can be \distracted" towards
the suboptimal action by the Markov chain. This is because even if the population plays
the optimal action with a high probability they can still observe the performance of the
18suboptimal action. Hence, since the suboptimal action is the best action for some states
of nature, randomness can constantly lead some players in the population to adopt the
suboptimal action for many periods in time. Thus, the continuous time limit of the process
converges to a situation in which the suboptimal action is played with a positive probability.
This is formally proven in the next proposition.
Proposition 3. Under the Stochastic Better Response, for some " > 0 there exists no f :
[0;1]2 ! [0;1] such that for all the environments (f1;:::;mg;P) we have that j~ 1 
1j < ".




j=1 j2j. Hence, we have
that 
1 = 1.
The proof goes by contradiction. Assume that for all " > 0 there exists a function
f : [0;1]2 ! [0;1] such that for all the environments (f1;:::;mg;P), j~ 1   
1j < ".
This can be rewritten as follows: there exists a sequence of functions f = ffng1
n=0 with





~ 1(fn) = 
1 = 1;
where ~ 1(fn) is the value of ~ 1 associated with the function fn.











Take now an environment E = (f1;2g;P) where 0 < 11 < 22 and ij = 0 for all
i 6= j. We could consider more general environments but that will only complicate the
exposition leaving the logic of the proof unchanged. P is such that action 1 is the optimal












Given that the transition matrix P is irreducible we have that 1 2 (0;1). Thus, we must








However, given that 11 < 22 and ij = 0 for all i 6= j, we have that fn(1) < fn(2) for
all n > 0. Hence, the sequence f is such that equation (13) cannot hold for the environment
E, a contradiction.
19The logic behind the proof is that if a learning rule makes the population to select the
optimal action in a given environment E0, then the rule must magnify the payos of each
action. This can be seen in equation (11), where, according to the learning rule, payos are
magnify to innity. However, if this is the case, an environment E can be found such that
there is a very rare state for which the payo of the suboptimal action is much bigger than
the payo of the optimal action for that state. In this situation, the learning rule that make
the population to select the best action for environment E0 will fail to do so in environment
E.
When only realized payos are observed, a dierent force operates. Once the population
is almost always playing the optimal action, it is very dicult for players to take notice of
the periods in which the suboptimal action is giving more payo than the optimal action. A
drawback for the population under this informational setting is that if both actions perform
not too dierently in terms of payos, the population may lock on the suboptimal action
forever. However, a learning rule can be designed such that this ineciency is avoided.
The next result states two important features about eciency rules under the General
Reinforcement Rule. The rst one is that if learning is suciently cautious in that the
magnitude of payos is diminished then the population will select the optimal action. The
second important feature is that how cautious the learning has to be depends on how big the
dierence in the long run average payo of both actions is. The more both actions dier in
terms of long run performance, the more cautious the learning has to be. This implies that
while a learning rule that is very cautious may not be able to make the population to select
the best action, this will only happen in environments where the two actions perform very
similarly in the long run. Hence, when cautious learning is exhibited, the possible loss in
payo from not selecting the best action is small.













j=1 j2jj > ", then we have that limt!1 t
1 = 
1.




j=1 j2j. Hence, we have
that 




j=1 j2jj > ", we must have
that
Pm
j=1 j(x1j   x2j) > x" for all x > 0.
20Using the rst order Taylor series for the logarithmic function around 1 we get that
log(1 + x1j   x2j) = x1j   x2j + R1(1 + x1j   x2j);
where R1(1 + x1j   x2j) is the remainder term and x > 0. Using the Lagrange form we
can rewrite the remainder term as
R1(1 + x1j   x2j) =
 1=y2
2
(1 + x1j   x2j   1)2;
where y lies between 1 and 1+x1j x2j. We can bound the absolute value of the remainder
term in the following way:







Moreover, we have that
log(1 + x1j   x2j) = x1j   x2j + R1(1 + x1j   x2j)
 x1j   x2j   jR1(1 + x1j   x2j)j:
This can be rewritten as
m X
j=1
j log(1 + x1j   x2j) 
m X
j=1




If we take x > 0 to be the minimum solution to the equation
x"  
x2
2(1   x)2 = 0;
we get that
x =





Thus, setting x > 0 as in equation (14) yields
m X
j=1
j logj > 0: (15)
Similar arguments show that
m X
j=1
j log(1   x1j + x2j)   
m X
j=1




21Hence, setting again x > 0 as in equation (14) yields
m X
j=1
j log ^ j < 0: (16)
Finally, combining inequalities (15) and (16) with Proposition 2 we get that if g(ij) =




j=1 j2jj > ", then we
have that limt!1 t
1 = 
1.
Note that if we set g(ij) as in Proposition 4, then lim"!0 g(ij) = 0. That is, a rule
that makes the population able to select the best action in all the environments must exhibit
arbitrarily slow learning.
5 Discussion
A way of enriching the model could be by adding idiosyncratic perturbations to payos.
This could be done by adding "ht to each payo ij. "ht are normally distributed zero mean
random variables that are independent across players h and time t. Since the rules we consider
under both scenarios can treat payos in a non-linear way, it is not true that the process
will converge to the same values as compared to the case without noise. The reason is the
same as why, for instance, E(x2) 6= E
 
(x + ")2
with E(") = 0. However, it can easily be
veried that adding noise makes no dierence to our results for all the learning rules that
treat payos linearly. Rules that treat payos linearly include the standard best response and
the bernoulli best response, for the case where foregone payos are observed, and the Cross
Learning Rule and the rules in BMS, for the case where foregone payos are not observed.
One might argue that if players had means of comparing the payo of the same action
across dierent time periods, they could recall dierent payo realizations over time and have
signicantly more information about the world they are living in. However, as showed by
Rustichini (1999) in a setting very similar to ours, even if players had innite memory and
could make this comparison, it is not true that they will learn the best action for sure.
5.1 Relating our results for the Stochastic Better Response with
Kosfeld et. al. (2002)
Kosfeld et. al. (2002) present a setting where a nite set of players play a normal-form game.
Each period players update their strategies myopically in the following way. They increase
the probability of playing an action if and only if that action is a best response to the action
22played by the other players. If there are many actions that are a best response, the increase
in probability is shared equally among the actions that are a best response. Formally, let
t
i(j) be the probability by which player j plays action i at time t. Dene s j as the actions
played by all the players but j. Finally, let Bj(s j) be the set of actions that are a best
response for player j to s j and let jBj(s j)j be the cardinality of Bj(s j). The evolution in









where  2 (0;1) is exogenously given.
Comparing this rule with the Stochastic Better Response there are two points worth
noting. First, the rule in Kosfeld et. al. (2002) is a particular case of the Stochastic Better
Response. Second, and most importantly, in our model players play against nature and not
against themselves. Hence, in Kosfeld et. al.'s (2002) setting, players best respond to the
actions of other players while in our setting players best respond to the actions of nature.
Kosfeld et. al. (2002) show that the continuous time limit of their process, when  is
made arbitrarily small, converges to a so-called Best-Reply Matching Equilibrium. In a Best-
Reply Matching Equilibrium, for every player, the probability of playing a given action is
equal to the probability by which that action is a best response given the strategies of the
other players.
Their result and our result for the Stochastic Better Response have the same intuition
behind them and in some situations are equivalent. Given that in our setting there are only






















i, which is the probability of playing action i, converges to the limiting proba-
bility that action i is a best response to the environment. Hence, the population strategies
match the nature's strategies, exactly as predicted by the Best-Reply Matching Equilibrium.
23In our results for the Stochastic Better Response we consider a much bigger set of rules
than do Kosfeld et. al. (2002). In particular, Kosfeld et. al. (2002) only consider one rule.
However, for the specic rule used by Kosfeld et. al. (2002), their results and ours come from
two dierent settings, as in their setting players play against each other while in our setting
players play against nature.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we investigated learning within an environment that changes according to a
Markov chain and where players learn according to reinforcement. The payo of each possible
action depends on the state of nature. Since transition between states follows a Markov Chain,
there is correlation between today's state and tomorrow's state of nature. We studied two
dierent scenarios, one in which realized and foregone payos are observed and another in
which only realized payos are observed. Our contribution to the literature relies on the
fact that we studied reinforcement learning in a setting where the realization of the state of
nature is correlated with the past.
The literature has focused on the study of learning only in a setting where the realization
of states (or the shocks to payos) is independent of its past values. The reason for this is
the technical complexities involved in dealing with the correlated realization of states.
There are several questions left for further research. For the case where foregone payos
are observed, we only characterized the asymptotic distribution when the learning step goes
to zero. For the case where foregone payos are not observed we are unable to quantify the
probabilities of reaching each endpoint where the process does not converge deterministically
to a single point.
The present piece of work explores learning in two very general scenarios but there are
other settings that could be of interest. For instance, how does local interaction aect learning
when the environment changes according to a Markov chain? What if there are non-stochastic
idiosyncratic payo dierences among players? Our paper also tried to shed some light on
the techniques that could be used for dealing with such environments. We expect that in the
future more papers dealing with non stationary environments will appear.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
We begin by proving the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For any " > 0 there exists a ^  > 0, ^ t(") > 0 and a sequence y = fytg1
t=^ t given by
y
^ t = 
^ t
1 and recursively for t > ^ t
yt+1 =
(
yt + 2(1   yt)
P
j:1j2j jf(j) with probability 1=2
yt + 2yt
P
j:1j<2j jf(j) with probability 1=2
;






1   ytj > "

= 0:
Proof. In the main text we dened h < m as the minimum natural number such that 1j  2j











> > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > :
^ t
1 + ^ t
2f(1) with probability 1
. . .
^ t
1 + ^ t
2f(h) with probability h
^ t
1   ^ t
1f(h+1) with probability h+1
. . .
^ t
1   ^ t
1f(m) with probability m
:








The existence of such ^ t(") is guaranteed by the fact that the transition matrix P is irreducible
and aperiodic and by the Perron-Frobenius theorem applied to P. In an abuse of notation,
from now on we will simply write ^ t to denote ^ t(").
Since E0 is linear in both ^ t
1 and yt, we have that for all t > ^ t, ^ t
1 = yt if and only if
E0(^ t+1
1 ) = E0(yt+1). Thus, given that y
^ t = ^ 
^ t
1, that E0 is linear in both ^ t
1 and yt and that
the distribution of both y and ^ 1 is aperiodic, we have that
E0(y
^ t+k) = E0(^ 
^ t+k
1 ) (19)
for all k 2 N.
Given the denition of y and equations (18) and (19) we must have that for any " > 0




1)   E0(yt+1)j > "

= 0: (20)
Given the specication of 1 and the denitions of ^ 1 and y, as  gets arbitrarily small,
the variance of 1, ^ 1 and y gets arbitrarily small as well. Formally, for any " > 0 there
exists a ^  > 0 and a t > ^ t such that for any  < ^  and k 2 N we have that V art(t+k
1 ) < ",
V art(^ t+k
1 ) < " and V art(yt+k) < ".
Assume that 1 does not converge in probability to y. As  goes to zero the variance of
both 1 and y goes to zero. Hence, both variables will converge in probability to a single
point. That is, for all  > 0 there exists  1,  y,   > 0 and  t 2 N such that for all  <  
and t >  t, P
 
jt
1    1j > 

= 0 and P
 
jyt
1    yj > 





1)    1j > 

= 0 and P
 
jE0(yt
1)    yj > 

= 0.




1 )   E0(yt+k)j > 

> 0
for all k 2 N, which contradicts equation (20). Hence, given that P
 
jt






1    yj > 

= 0 and  1 =  y, we must have that for any " > 0 there exists a ^  such that






1   ytj > "

= 0:
27In the next lemma we establish that y converges in probability to ~ .





jyt   ~ j > "

= 0:
Proof. First, note that the point yt = ~ , with ~  as dened in Proposition 1, solves the
equation
yt + 2(1   yt)
X
j:1j2j




Dene now the sequence y1 = fyt
1g1




yt if yt  ~ 
~  otherwise
:
Hence, we have that E0(yt)  E0(yt
1) for all t > ^ t. Note that if yt > ~  then we have that
E0(yt+1) < E0(yt). This implies that E0(yt+1
1 ) < E0(yt
1) for all yt
1 > ~  and E0(yt+1
1 ) = E0(yt
1)
for yt
1 = ~ . Therefore, y1 is a super-martingale with lower-bound ~ . Thus, by the Martingale
convergence theorem, limt!1 yt
1 exists. Given that E0(yt+1
1 ) < E0(yt
1) for all yt
1 > ~  and
E0(yt+1
1 ) = E0(yt
1) for yt
1 = ~ , we must have that limt!1 yt
1 = ~ . This implies that y1
converges in probability to ~ .
Dene now the sequence y2 = fyt
2g1




yt if yt  ~ 
~  otherwise
:
Hence, we have that E0(yt)  E0(yt
1) for all t > ^ t. Note that if y < ~  then we have that
E0(yt+1) > E0(yt). This implies that E0(yt+1
2 ) > E0(yt
2) for all yt
2 < ~  and E0(yt+1
2 ) = E0(yt
2)
for yt
2 = ~ . Therefore, y2 is a sub-martingale with upper-bound ~ . Thus, by the Martingale
convergence theorem, limt!1 yt
2 exists. Given that E0(yt+1
2 ) > E0(yt
2) for all yt
2 < ~  and
E0(yt+1
2 ) = E0(yt
2) for yt
1 = ~ , we must have that limt!1 yt
2 = ~ . This implies that y2
converges in probability to ~ .














2   ~ j > "

= 0:
We know, given the denition of y, that for any " > 0 there exists a ^  > 0 and a t >  t
such that for any  < ^  and h > t we have that V art(yt+h) < ". This, together with the fact
that E0(yt)  E0(yt
1) and E0(yt)  E0(yt
1) for all t > ^ t implies that for all t > maxf t;^ tg we
must have that limt!1 yt = ~ . This implies that y converges in probability to ~ .
28Now we are able to prove the result in Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. We know from Lemma 2 that 1 converges in probability to y. From
Lemma 3 we also know that y converges in probability to ~ . Hence, we must have that 1
converges in probability to ~ . This is the result of the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2
Whenever t
1 is arbitrarily close to 0 we have that
t+1
1 jj = t
1(1 + g(2j)   g(1j)) + o(t
1):
Dene j = 1 + g(2j)   g(1j) for all j 2 f1;:::;mg. Hence, given that g is increasing,
we have that i  1 < j if and only if 1i  2i and 1j < 2j. We can approximate the
equation for the evolution of the sequence 1 when t
1 is arbitrarily close to 0 as follows:
t+1
1 jj = jt
1:
Lemma 4. For any  t
1 2 (0;1) and any " > 0 there exists a t
1 <  t
1 and a  k 2 N such that
for k >  k
P
 t+k
1   ^ t+k
1
  > "

= 0;
where ^ t+ k








1 with probability 1
. . .
mt+k
1 with probability m
for k >  k.
Proof. Given that the transition matrix P is irreducible and aperiodic and that the number of
states is nite, we have the standard result that the empirical distribution of states converges
to the limiting distribution of states. This can be rewritten as: for any  > 0 there exists a















for all j 2 f1;:::;mg.
We have seen before that if t
1 is arbitrarily close to 0 we can write t+1
1 jj = jt
1. In
other words, for any  > 0 there exists a  1() 2 (0;1) such that if t










29for all j 2 f1;:::;mg. This result can also be expressed as follows. For any  > 0 and any
k 2 N there exists a  1() 2 (0;1) such that if t










Hence, we have the following two facts. First, the probability of a state being realized a
suciently far way number of periods converges to the limiting distribution of the Markov
chain. Second, that t+1
1 jj behaves as jt
1 if t
1 is suciently small. Then, for k suciently
large and t
1 suciently close to 0 we have that for all j 2 f1;:::;mg, t+k+1
1 = jt+k
1 with
probability j. In other words, combining the results in equations (21) and (22) we can write
that for all " > 0 there exists a  k(") 2 N and  1(") 2 (0;1), such that for all k >  k(") and
t










where ^ t+ k








1 with probability 1
. . .
mt+k
1 with probability m
for k >  k.
Lemma 5. The sequence 1 cannot converge to 0 if
m X
j=1
j logj > 0:
There is a positive probability that the sequence t
1 converges to 0 if
m X
j=1
j logj < 0:
Proof. Reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 1 in Ellison and Fudenberg (1995), the sequence
1 can converge to zero if and only if the sequence y = log1 can converge to  1. Using again
the proof from Lemma 1 in Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) and Lemma 4 in this appendix,
the sequence y can converge to  1 only if
Pm
j=1 j logj < 0. The result follows.
To study the situation in which the process is arbitrarily close to 1, we proceed as follows.
First, we dene wt = 1   t
1. Then we apply the analysis above to the variable wt. Dene
^ j = 1+g(2j) g(1j). Then we have that for all " > 0 there exists a  k 2 N and  w 2 (0;1)
such that for all k >  k and wt <  w we have that
P
 wt+k   ^ wt+k  > "

= 0;





^ 1wt+k with probability 1
. . .
^ mwt+k with probability m
for k >  k.
An analogous to Lemma 5 when t
1 is close to 1 is the following:
Lemma 6. The sequence 1 cannot converge to 1 if
m X
j=1
j log ^ j > 0:
There is a positive probability that the sequence 1 converges to 1 if
m X
j=1
j log ^ j < 0:
Summing up the results from lemmas 5 and 6 the result in Proposition 2 follows.
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